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SECTION 10(j) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT: SUGGESTED REFORMS
FOR AN EXPANDED USE
DONALD J. SIEGEL*
The use of the injunction has long been a part of American labor
relations. Up to 1932 the injunction was frequently utilized; 1. there-
after, its use was restricted by the Norris-LaGuardia Act' and similar
state statutes.' With the passage of the 1947 amendments to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA),' however, the injunction became
an important tool for the enforcement of that Act. Section 10 (1) of the
NLRA directs the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to seek
temporary injunctive relief in order to remedy certain union unfair
labor practices.' Section 10(j) of the Act gives the NLRB authority
to seek temporary injunctive relief to remedy any other type of unfair
labor practice.° Section 10(l) is a mandatory provision; the use of the
10(j) remedy is discretionary with the Board. While union unfair
labor practices have been extensively enjoined under section 10(1),
the Board has made relatively little use of its authority to enjoin other
alleged unfair labor practices pursuant to section 100).7 The Board's
reluctance to use the 10(j) remedy continues, despite congressional
encouragement to make more effective use of the section.'
At present, with the NLRB caseload rapidly expanding° and the
adequacy of Board relief often questioned,'" it is appropriate to re-
* B.A. University of Wisconsin, 1967; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1971; Member of
the Massachusetts Bar; Associate, Segal, Roitman & Coleman, Boston, Massachusetts.
1 See generally, F. Frankfurter and N. Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930).
2 29 U.S.C, §§ 101 et seq. (1970).
8 According to Cox and Bok, Labor Law: Cases and Materials, 102 (6th ed. 1965),
the following states have anti-injunction statutes very similar to the federal Act; New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
5 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970).
I See tables at p. 461 infra.
8 See pp. 470-71 infra.
0 Charges against employers have increased by 400% from fiscal year 1948 to fiscal
year 1970. The growth in the number of charges against unions has been even more
pronounced. Many charges of union unfair labor practices lead to 10(1) injunctions.
Samoff, The Case of the Burgeoning Load of the NLRB, 22 Lab. L.J. 611, 615 (1971).
10 See generally, Report of the Special Subcomm. on Labor, House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., National Labor Relations Act Remedies: The Un-
fulfilled Promise (Comm. Print 1968); McCulloch, New Remedies Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 21 N.Y.U. Conference on Labor 223 (1968); McCulloch, Past,
Present and Future Remedies Under Section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA, 19 Lab. L.J. 131
(1968); Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 38 (1964).
See also International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. National
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assess the relationship between an increased use of the 10(j) remedy
and more effective enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act.
This article will examine the NLRB internal procedures relative to
the use of 10(j) and the role of the courts in granting or denying the
injunction. It will demonstrate the need for revision of the criteria
which the Board employs to determine its use of 10(j) as well as the
necessity for expanded use of this discretionary provision. A set of re-
vised criteria will be proposed which, it is submitted, if adopted would
lead to such expanded use and, concomitantly, to a more effective en-
forcement of the National Labor Relations Act.
I. INTERNAL PROCEDURES OF THE NLRB
A. Powers of the General Counsel
Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that
the National Labor Relation Board
shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint . . . charging
that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair
labor practice, to petition any United States district court ...
for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order."
Originally, the General Counsel of the Board had authority to initiate
and prosecute injunction proceedings on behalf of the Board, apparently
without the latter's prior approval.' This procedure was held to be a
lawful delegation of power from the Board to the General Counsel in
Evans v. International Typographical Union." There, the respondent
union had moved to dismiss the NLRB's petition on the ground, inter
alia, that the Board's delegation of "full and final authority and respon-
sibility . . . for initiating and prosecuting injunctive proceedings as
provided for in Section 10(j)" was invalid." The court rejected this
contention on two grounds. First, observing that the NLRA gave re-
gional directors authority to initiate proceedings' 5 and that the Act
gave the General Counsel supervision over all personnel in the regional
offices," the court concluded that a delegation of authority by the Board
Labor Relations Board (Tiidee I), 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950
(1970), and Ex-Cello Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970), rev'd in
part, 76 L.R.R.M. 2753 (D.C. Cir. 1971), reversal vacated, 77 L.R.R.M. 2547 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
11 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970).
12 "General Counsel shall exercise full and final authority and responsibility, on be-
half of the Board, for initiating and prosecuting injunction proceedings as provided for in
Section 10(j) and (1)." Statement of Delegation of Certain Powers of the National Labor
Relations Board to the General Counsel, § 204.3(a) (4), 13 Fed. Reg. 655 (1948).
12 76 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ind. 1948).
14 See note 12 supra.
15 76 F. Supp. at 887.
_to Id. at 888.
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to the regional directors was, in effect, nothing less than 'a delegation
of authority to the General Counsel." Second, in examining the face
of the statute itself, the court found that the provision imposing upon
the General Counsel "such other duties as the Board may prescribe"
justified the Board's delegation of functions other than those specifically
committed to the General Counsel by statute. To conclude otherwise,
ruled the court, would be to hold that the provision was "superfluous
and without meaning or purpose." 18
In 1958, however, the Board issued a memorandum which effec-
tively withdrew from the General Counsel the authority to initiate pro-
ceedings:
On behalf of the Board the General Counsel of the Board will,
in full accordance with the directions of the Board ... initiate
and prosecute injunction proceedings as provided in Section
10 (j) [1] rovided, however, that the General Counsel will
initiate and conduct injunction proceedings under Section 10
(j) ... only upon approval of the Board ...."
The earlier procedure authorizing the General Counsel to initiate
proceedings without Board approval appears to be more desirable. The
current procedure is inconsistent with the intended division of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board into judicial and prosecutive branches. 2°
The current procedure gives the Board an unfortunate opportunity
both to perform a function of a prosecutive nature and to consider, ex
parte, facts relating to issues which ultimately it will have to resolve
in a quasi-judicial capacity. 21 Furthermore, since the Board must give
17 Id.
18
 Id. at 889.
10 National Labor Relations Board: Delegation of Powers to General Counsel. BNA
LRX 4201 (1961).
20 "The combination of the provisions dealing with the authority of the General
Counsel, the provision abolishing the Board's review division, and the provisions relating
to the trial examiners and their reports effectively limit the Board to the performance of
quasijudicial functions." Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 3020, H.R. Rep. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-38 (1947).
21 76 F. Supp. at 889. Former Chairman McCulloch's response to this criticism is not
sufficient to allay the misgivings expressed:
But does not our discussion and deliberation at this initial phase of the case lead
to "prejudging," a blending of the role of prosecutor and judge? I do not think so.
We form opinions as we study the facts alleged and set down in the memoranda,
but our attention is directed not so much to the merits as to the alleged need for
interim relief, to considerations of public and private interest in general. When
the case comes to us for decision on the merits, some year-and-a-half and per-
haps 3,000 cases later, the earlier impressions often are long since forgotten. The
record, 'intermediate report, exceptions and briefs then before us furnish the real
foundation for our final decision. This is the practical answer to the charge of
prejudgment.
Address by former Board Chairman Frank McCulloch, Eighth Annual Joint -Industrial
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careful study ,to each request for authorization to use section 10(j), 22
the time it spends deliberating upon each request no doubt delays the
initiation of necessary proceedings in the district court. 23
B. Procedure and Criteria for Board Action
Generally, requests for section 10(j) relief are submitted to a
regional office by a party indicating that interim injunctive relief is
required to enjoin the continuation of an unfair labor practice. The
regional office then submits to the District Court Branch of the Gen-
eral Counsel's Office in Washington, D.C., a report of its investigation
and a recommendation as to whether or not 10 (j) proceedings should
be instituted. This procedure may be followed even in the absence of a
request from a party, if, in the opinion of the regional director, 10(j)
relief is warranted. If the General Counsel concludes that 10(j) pro-
ceedings are not warranted, no further action is taken on the request.
If he decides that 10(j) proceedings are necessary, he must request
authority from the Board to institute such proceedings.'
Relations Conference of Michigan State University, April 19, 1962. Reprinted in 49
L.R.R.M. 74, 83 (1962).
22
 We have an internal system of checks and balances also which deters abuse. The
Board has delegated to the General Counsel the responsibility for screening the
60 or so annual requests for injunctive relief. He has authority to reject those he
regards as completely lacking in merit and refers the remainder to the Board with
a detailed memorandum and a recommended course of action either for or against
seeking injunctive relief. Then follows discussion among the five Board members,
friendly, but often sharp; and finally comes a decision which usually follows the
recommendations of the General Counsel, but not always. In short, the group
discussion by Presidentially-appointed, independent (and we are that) members
minimizes the potential for abuse.
Id.
22 The average amount of time spent by the Board in disposing of a request for
authorization to use section 10(j) was not available to the author. In reply to a request
for the length of time required to process 10(j) authorization requests, Assistant General
Counsel Serot responded:
[T]he time span varies from case to case depending upon the complexity of the
facts, the novelty of the issues and the legal research required in such connection.
Additionally, there may be need for further investigation and, in many instances,
the parties ask for an opportunity orally to present their respective positions to
the General Counsel, and sometimes to submit written memoranda, all of which
will add to the length of time a given case is considered.
Because of the time and work required to do so, we have not collected and
analyzed the information in this connection for the past 10 years. However, we
are in a position to give you some information for fiscal year 1970 (July 1, 1969
to June 30, 1970) which might be of value to you. During that period, 69 re-
quests for 10(j) injunctions were considered by the General Counsel's office to
the point where a determination was made. The average time to process these
cases in the General Counsel's office from the time all necessary information was
received in Washington was 11 days, which includes Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays.
Letter from Julius G. Serot, Assistant General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board,
to the author, Feb. 19, 1971.
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The number of requests from regional directors for authorization
to use section 10(j) varies from year to year. The following chart pro-
vides figures for the period from January, 1962, to December 16, 1970:
Requests by Regional Directors for 10(j) Authorization 26










Eight Year Period—Total Requests 1622
Reference to the number of petitions actually filed by the General Coun-
sel reveals that most of the requests are disapproved:










Eight Year Period—Total Petitions Filed 149
The criteria by which the Board rules on requests for authorization
to use section 10(j) are set out in the NLRB Internal Instruction
and Guidelines Manual—Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings, and they
will soon be made public in the NLRB Field Manual." Section 10310.2
24 Id.
25 This chart was based on information supplied by Julius G. Serot's letter, supra
note 23. The figures are based on calendar years.
ze 27 NLRB Ann. Rep. 280 (1962). Figures in this chart are based on fiscal years.
27 28 NLRB Ann. Rep. 184 (1963).
28 29 NLRB Ann. Rep. 203 (1964).
23 30 NLRB Ann. Rep. 143 (1965).
30 31 NLRB Ann. Rep. 151 (1966).
81 32 NLRB Ann. Rep. 175 (1967).
82 33 NLRB Ann. Rep. 165 (1968). In four more 10(j) cases, the Board author-
ized the filing of a petition but none was filed because the case was settled shortly after
the Board action.
33 34 NLRB Ann. Rep. 238 (1969).
34 35 NLRB Ann. Rep. 196 (1970).
85 The Board has been criticized before for not making public the criteria by which
it decides whether or not to authorize utilization of section 10(j). See, for example,
McLeod v. General Electric Company, 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), where the
court stated:
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of the Internal Instructions Manual, entitled "Guidelines for the
Utilization of Section 10(j)," is prefaced by an acknowledgment that
there is neither statutory nor case law guidance for determining whether
proceedings under 10(j) are appropriate. The section, however, does
suggest several criteria which Board experience has shown to be rele-
vant:
1. the clarity of the alleged violation;
2. whether the case involves the shutdown of important busi-
ness operations which, because of their special nature, would
have an extraordinary impact on the public interest;
3. whether the alleged unfair labor practice involves an un-
usually wide geographic area, and thus creates special prob-
lems of public concern;
4. whether the unfair labor practice poses special remedy
problems so that resort solely to the Act's regular enforcement
proceedings would probably render it impossible either to re-
store the status qua or to dissipate effectively the conse-
quences of the unfair labor practice;
5. whether the unfair labor practice involves interference
with the conduct of an election or constitutes a clear and fla-
grant disregard of Board certification of a bargaining repre-
sentative or other Board procedure;
It seems desirable—it would surely be helpful—for the Board, after nearly
twenty years of work with Section 10(1), to formulate and state in some form
more authoritative than random speeches by members the criteria by which it
determines whether to proceed under this Section. Such a formulation would
guide the public, the courts, the Agency itself, and give a measure of assurance
that the action taken in individual cases is reasonably principled. This is not the
first time, of course, that the Board as well as other agencies have been urged to
tackle more widely the hard task of articulating intelligible and knowable rules
of general applicability.
Id, at 708 n.14.
On December 9, 1970, the author wrote to H. Stephen Gordon, Associate General
Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, to request a copy of § 10310 of the Internal
Instructions Manual. On December 17, 1970, Eugene Rosenfeld, Deputy Assistant General
Counsel, wrote to the author stating that § 10310 of the Internal Instructions Manual
was not available to the public because it was considered to come within the exceptions
to § 102.117(a)(1)(ii) of the Board Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended.
On January 6, 1971, Professor David Shapiro of the Harvard Law School wrote to
the Honorable Edward Miller, Chairman, National Labor Relations Board, in support of
the author's request for a copy . of § 10310 of the Internal Instructions Manual. The
author renewed his request for same in that letter. Professor Shapiro argued that the
NLRB was obligated to make the requested information available to the author pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. 552, the Freedom of Information Amendments to the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.
Chairman Miller responded in a letter dated Jan. 15, 1971, in which he said that he
had reexamined the unreleased portions of 1 10310. The Chairman announced that he
had decided to release # 10310 to the public and that it would soon be published in the
publicly available NLRB Field Manual.
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6. whether the continuation of the alleged unfair labor prac-
tice will cause exceptional hardship to the charging party;
7. whether the current unfair labor practice is part of a
continuing or repetitious pattern;
8. whether, if violence is involved, the violence is of such a
nature as to be out of control of local authorities or otherwise
widespread and susceptible of control by 10(j) relief."
These criteria, however, appear to be little more than a list of the
factors which the Board has considered in the past in determining
whether to authorize the use of section 10(j). Their indefinite status
before the Board is indicated in the last paragraph of the section itself:
These factors are not all inclusive, nor does the presence of
one or more factors enumerated above necessarily require that
we institute 10(5) proceedings . . . 37
A further illustration of the purely advisory status of the guidelines is
the following statement of the Chairman of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board:
[T] he Guidelines, as stated in the preface to the Field Manual,
are issued by the General Counsel "to establish procedural
and operational instructions for the guidance of agency staff
.... [They] are not Board rulings or directives, and are not a
form of authority binding upon the Board.""
On the rare occasions where the Board has publicly listed the eight
criteria of section 10310.2, it has referred to them not as criteria but,
rather, as factors which the Board may consider when deciding whether
to authorize a petition for injunctive relief."
89 NLRB Internal Instructions and Guidelines Manual, § 10310.2.
37 Id.
38 Letter from Honorable Edward B. Miller, Chairman, National Labor Relations
Board, to Professor David Shapiro, January 15, 1971.
39 See, for instance, Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 17 n.16, McLeod v. General
Electric Co., 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966), wherein the eight criteria are introduced with
the following phrase: "An analysis of past cases indicates that consideration has been
given to such factors as . . ." (emphasis added).
See also the statement of former General Counsel Stuart Rothman, made at the
Hearings on General Study into the Procedures of the NLRB and its Administration of
the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 as Amended Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l
Labor Relations Board of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 1236 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings], where the list of eight
criteria was introduced as follows: "No rigid criteria for the authorization of Section
10(j) action has been adopted by the Board: rather, each case has been considered on its
own merits. An analysis of past cases, however, indicates that consideration has been
given to such factors as .. ." (emphasis added).
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C. Proposed New Criteria
Clearly, a new and more meaningful set of criteria is needed. These
standards should be made public and should serve to "guide the public,
the courts, the agency itself, and [to] give a measure of assurance that
the action taken in the individual cases is reasonably principled.'
The National Labor Relations Act.'" itself does not indicate what criteria
the Board should use in deciding whether to authorize the use of Sec-
tion 10(j). Reference, therefore, must be made to the legislative history
of the Act. With regard to why subsection (j) was added to former
section 10, the Senate Report indicated that:
Experience under the National Labor Relations Act has
demonstrated that by reason of lengthy hearings and litiga-
tion enforcing its orders, the Board has not been able in some
instances to correct unfair labor practices until after substan-
tial injury has been done. Under the present act the Board is
empowered to seek interim relief only after it has filed in the
appropriate circuit court of appeals its order and the record
on which it is based. Since the Board's orders are not self-en-
forcing, it has sometimes been possible for persons violating
the act to accomplish their unlawful objective before being
placed under any legal restraint and thereby to make it impos-
sible or not feasible to restore or preserve the status quo pend-
ing litigation.
In subsections (j) and (1) to section 10 the Board is
given additional authority to seek injunctive relief. By section
10(j), the Board is authorized, after it has issued a complaint
alleging the commission of unfair labor practices by either an
employer or a labor organization or its agent, to petition the
appropriate district court for temporary relief or restraining
order. Thus the Board need not wait, if the circumstances
call for such relief, until it has held a hearing, issued its order,
and petitioned for enforcement of its order."
Congressional concern with delay inherent in the Board's regular en-
forcement procedures is further highlighted in the following passage:
Time is usually of the essence in these matters, and con-
sequently the relatively slow procedure of Board hearing and
order, followed many months later by an enforcing decree of
the circuit court of appeals, falls short of achieving the desired
objectives—the prompt elimination of the obstructions to the
40 See note 35 supra.
41 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
42 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947).
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free flow of commerce and encouragement of the practice and
procedure of free and private collective bargaining. Hence we
have provided that the Board, acting in the public interest
and not in vindication of purely private rights, may seek in-
junctive relief in the case of all types of unfair labor practices
and that it shall also seek such relief in the case of strikes
and boycotts defined as unfair labor practices.'`
The above quoted excerpts from the legislative history suggest that
Congress was concerned principally with realization of the objectives
of the National Labor Relations Act—specifically, the prompt elimina-
tion of any obstruction to the free flow of commerce, and the encour-
agement of free and private collective bargaining. The legislative
history further suggests that Congress had previously identified certain
practices which were inconsistent with the above objectives and that it
declared additional acts to be unfair labor practices in an effort to
realize the objectives of the NLRA. Congress also recognized that the
Board's pre-Amendment enforcement powers often were inadequate to
insure achievement of the Act's objectives. In many instances the
Board could not act quickly enough—with the result that persons violat-
ing the Act achieved their unlawful goals. To the extent that violators
were thus successful, the congressionally defined public interest suf-
fered substantial injury. Congress sought to remedy such injury to the
public interest by giving the Board a means to preserve the status quo
pending Board adjudication of the complaint.
The foregoing analysis of the legislative history suggests several
criteria by which the Board can determine whether to authorize the
use of section 10(j). It is submitted that the Board should consider
the following three criteria:
1. the clarity of the violation;
2. the extent to which the alleged violator will achieve an un-
lawful objective if preliminary relief is not sought and ob-
tained; and
3. the difficulty in restoring and/or preserving the pre-viola-
tion status quo if preliminary relief is not sought and obtained.
These criteria form an analytical framework within which every re-
quest for authorization to use 10(j) may be evaluated. They are gen-
eral enough to be flexible but definite enough to provide a sound basis
48 Id. at 8. These excerpts are the only parts of the legislative history of the Labor
Management Relations Act that deal in a substantive manner with § 10(j). The House
version, H.R. 3020, did not contain § 10(j) or anything similar to it the Senate version,
S. 1126, contained § 10(j) in substantially the same language in which it was enacted.
The House conferees accepted the Senate view and 10(j) was incorporated in the act.
See Conference Report, supra note 20, at.57.
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upon which the decision to invoke 10(j) may be properly determined.
The three proposed standards would replace the above noted list of
factors heretofore considered by the Board in deciding whether or not
to authorize the use of 10(j).
It is likely that faithful implementation of the proposed criteria
would lead to an increase in the number of 10(j) requests in several
areas of enforcement. The first of these is pre-election misconduct.
Of ten an employer will achieve an unlawful objective by engaging in
unfair labor practices prior to an NLRB election. The issuance of an
unfair labor practice complaint will usually postpone the election until
adjudication of that complaint; 44 such an adjudication may take
months or even years to complete." The union may find it difficult,
if not impossible, to maintain its strength during the pendency of
litigation; this is especially so if the employer has discharged some or
all union leaders just prior to the election. Despite the opportunity for
their reinstatement with back pay, immediate relief is necessary in
order to prevent irreparable injury." Continuous employment is more
satisfactory than reinstatement with compensation long after the fact.
As one scholar has noted, even greater injury may be suffered by the
union and the remaining employees. Given the dependence of a union
on an effective committee of employees within the plant, the discharge
of several principal activists may seriously damage the union's
campaign."
It is probable that normal Board remedies will not restore to the
union the strength it had prior to the violations. Many of the dis-
chargees might refuse the opportunity for reinstatement, preferring
a lump sum settlement instead. Even if the dischargees were to accept
reinstatement with back pay, their ardor for unionization may be di-
minished. Other employees, even though observing colleagues rein-
stated with back pay, may nevertheless be reluctant to gamble on
suffering similar treatment.
Only a Board order to bargain can restore to the union its pre-
violation status quo in this context. If the union had authorization
cards from a majority of employees in the unit prior to the employer's
violations, a bargaining order would be possible." If, however, the union
44 Cox and Bolt, supra note 3, at 312.
45 The median time from charge to complaint is 59 days. It takes an average of 73
days from the docketing of the case until it is tried and an additional 114 days for the
Trial Examiner to write his opinion. The average time for the Board to dispose of an
appeal from the decision of a Trial Examiner is 105 days. In 1966, 64% of all Board
decisions were appealed to the circuit courts of appeal. Report of the Special Subcomm.
on Labor, supra note 10, at 39-40.
40
 Bok, supra note 10.
47 Id. at 130-31.
48 See NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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did not have authorization cards from a majority of employees prior
to the violations, such an order would probably not be made." Even
if made and upheld, an order to bargain might have the disadvantage
of imposing an unwanted bargaining representative upon the employ-
ees.' A section 10(j) petition would seem to be appropriate in such a
situation. It would serve to preserve the pre-violation status quo and
would permit the election to take place as scheduled, if the union so
desired." It would also reduce the likelihood that the Board, in order
to deny the employer the fruits of his unfair labor practice, would have
to impose an unwanted bargaining representative upon the employees.
A second situation where the suggested criteria would probably
lead to more 10(j) petitions is that of the refusal to bargain. Such vio-
lations also lead to lengthy litigation during which the strength of a
union often diminishes. The employer's unlawful objective in this situa-
tion would be (1) to avoid having to deal with the union at all, or (2)
to avoid or postpone dealing with the union for the pendency of the
litigation. The first objective can be frustrated by an order to bargain.
Such an order, however, is subject to the possibility that, when made,
it might result in the imposition upon employees of a bargaining rep-
resentative they no longer desire. A section 10(j) petition would be
useful in avoiding such a situation. The second objective can be pre-
vented only by preliminary relief granted pursuant to section 10(j).
Indeed, under the Board's current interpretation of the Act," a 10(j)
injunction is the only way to insure that during the pending litigation
the employees will receive from the employer that which they would
have received from him had he bargained in good faith.
A third situation where the suggested criteria would likely lead to
increased requests for 10(j) relief is that of employer assistance to,
or domination of, a labor organization during an organizational drive
4 ° In Heck's Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 146, 77 L.R.R.M. 1513 (1971), the NLRB de-
clined to issue an order to bargain where less than a majority of members of the bar-
gaining unit had signed authorization cards. The Board noted that "the Union asks the
Board to do something that it has never done throughout its history: to order bar-
gaining with a union which has at no time established its majority status in the unit in
which bargaining is requested." Id. at 1516.
50 Vet the order is the only way to prevent the employer from achieving an un-
lawful purpose at this late date.
51 Cox and Bak, supra note 3, at 312, point out: "For many years, it has been the
Board's policy not to proceed with an election while substantial unfair labor practice
charges are pending. Nevertheless, the Board has proceeded with an election if the party
filing the charge consented, but the charge has then been considered waived and the
charging party could not seek to set aside the election on the basis of the allegations in
question. The significance of the last rule, however, has been seriously qualified by the
Bernd Foam decision . . . for a party may now proceed to an election and, if the elec-
tion is lost, make objections to the election and file charges based on allegations of un-
lawful conduct occurring prior to the election:"
52 See generally sources cited in note 10 supra.	 -
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between that organization and a second union. In such a situation the
employer will often recognize the favored union, bargain with it, and
enter into a contract containing a strong union security provision. The
employer's objective may be either permanent or temporary. He may
hope to avoid dealing with the second union altogether, or he may only
want to postpone bargaining with it. Although the permanent objective
can be frustrated by an order to bargain with the second union, such
an order has distinct disadvantages.
It is probable that the strength of the second union will have suf-
fered considerably during the period in which the employer has bar-
gained and contracted with the favored union. In addition, it is possible
that many, if not most, employees will be satisfied with the favored
union and its representation and will not be anxious to be represented
by the second union. In this context, an order to bargain definitely im-
poses an unwanted bargaining representative upon the majority. If a
10(j) injunction were granted in this situation, the bargaining relation-
ship between employer and favored union could be restrained, and any
loyalty of the employees to the favored union would be based on factors
other than its current representation. If the employer's objective is
temporary then, clearly, only preliminary relief can frustrate it. A pre-
liminary injunction in the form of an order to bargain with the second
union would be appropriate if the latter could prove that it represented
a clear majority of the employees.
Several advantages will flow from adoption of the new criteria.
First, an analytical framework based on legislative history will replace
the not too meaningful list of factors which the Board has heretofore
considered in disposing of requests to authorize preliminary relief. This
framework would provide a definite basis upon which the parties could
argue about the advisability of 10(j) relief," and upon which the Board
could consistently and rationally dispose of each request. It would
"give a measure of assurance that the action taken in individual cases
is reasonably principled."" Second, the new criteria would permit a
more effective enforcement of the Act. In cases where the employer
previously would have been able to achieve an unlawful objective, and
thereby cause substantial injury to the public interest as declared by
Congress, he would no longer be able to do so. Upon showing of a rea-
sonable likelihood that a violation has taken place, that employer would
53 Under current procedures the parties actively argue to the General Counsel about
the advisability of 10(j) relief, but evidently, no arguments are made directly to the
Board: "tIln many instances, the parties ask for an opportunity orally to present their
respective positions to the General Counsel, and sometimes to submit written memo-
randa. . . ." Letter from Julius G. Serot, Assistant General Counsel, National Labor
Relations Board, to the author, Feb. 19, 1971.
54 See note 35 supra.
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be subject to a 10(j) petition under the proposed criteria. Finally,.the
new criteria, and the expanded use of section 10(j) which should result
from their faithful implementation, might deter the commission of
numerous unfair labor practices:
Greater use of the preliminary injunction would also do much
to make this remedy more realistic in the eyes of the parties
and thus enhance its deterrent effect. In this way, the Board
might find it much easier to settle cases where employers
would otherwise be content to profit from the delay resulting
from a full dress administrative proceeding."
It should be noted that adoption and implementation of the pro-
posed criteria would not be without problems. A larger workload for
the General Counsel, but presumably not for the Board, would surely
follow. The increased workload would occur on two levels. The General
Counsel's Washington, D.C., staff would be required to dispose of more
requests to use section 10(j), and the regional offices would be required
to prosecute more petitions in the district courts. Quite often, 10(j)
hearings resemble a presentation of the merits of the complaint and
may take several days;" sufficient manpower would be required to
make such a presentation on relatively short notice. If this manpower
is not now available to both the General Counsel and the regional offices,
it should be made available at the earliest possible time. The suggested
criteria cannot be faithfully implemented without it.
Until such manpower is made available, however, the General
Counsel should seek to supplement his own resources. One means of
doing so would be to permit the charging party to intervene in the 10(j)
hearing and to assist the regional office in the preparation and/or pre-
sentation of its case." In the past, the Board has opposed such inter-
vention and the courts have denied it." With the implementation of the
suggested criteria, however, the Board may reconsider its view about
intervention. Under the old criteria, there was nothing to be gained
from intervention because the 10(j) caseload was very light." Given
the present increased caseload, there now would be an advantage-
55 Bok, supra note 10, at 131.
56 It is not unusual for such hearings to take a full week. For instance, the evi-
dentiary hearing in McLeod v. General Electric Co. took one full week. 257 F. Supp. at
692.
57 No instances where the Agency has cooperated in such an intervention can be
found.
58 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
59 In fiscal 1969, only fifteen petitions for 10(j) relief were authorized and three of
these were settled before they reached the hearing stage. 34 NLRB Ann. Rep. 160 (1969).
The record number of 10(j) petitions authorized in any one year occurred in fiscal 1967,
when 22 were approved. 32 NLRB Ann. Rep. 175. The Board has over 30 regional
offices and some of those offices have subregions] offices.
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additional'manpower to implement the new criteria and to enforce the
Act-more effectively.
• • Although intervention with the approval of the General Counsel
would alleviate the shortage of manpower, intervention as a matter of
right could have the opposite effect." If the Board opposed the interven-
tion, staff attorneys would have to spend time preparing an argument
against the intervention. If the intervention were granted, considerable
time might be spent arguing over differences between the Board and the
intervenor. In order to get the benefits of intervention without incurring
the attendant disadvantages, it would not be unreasonable for the Board
to require assurances from the charging party that the Board would
have the final word on any differences that might arise between them
during the hearing.° This informal agreement could be the price for
the Board's support of the charging party's request to intervene. Once
such an agreement is reached the Board is assured of control of the
suit and the charging party is assured that manpower problems will
not preclude an otherwise meritorious request for preliminary relief.
One final problem which will result from faithful implementation
of the new criteria will be additional work for the federal district courts.
A hearing for 10(j) relief is often quite lengthy and may involve com-
plex issues of law and fact. There is little that the Board can do . to
ease this problem. Only additional judges or some type of court
action can resolve it. In any event, the advantages flowing from the
implementation of the new criteria outweigh this particular concern.
D. Congressional Review of NLRB Internal Procedures
The only congressional review of the internal procedures described
above was made in 1961 by the Subcommittee on the National Labor
Relations Board, House Committee on Education and Labor. That sub-
committee made the following recommendation:
The names of Norris and LaGuardia are constant reminders
of the dangers inherent in conducting labor-management rela-
tions by way of injunction. Nevertheless, this subcommittee
finds that injunctions are now utilized extensively against
union activities and to an almost nonexistent extent against
employer unfair labor practices. Failure to utilize the 10(j)
discretionary injunction sometimes results in irreparable in-
jury. This subcommittee therefore recommends that the Labor
Board give careful consideration to greater utilization of the
00 Currently, the charging party does not have a right to intervene in 10(j) hear-
ings. Reynolds v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
61 For instance, the parties might differ among themselves on the terms of a settle-
ment or the scope of the decree.
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10(j) injunction in situations when unfair labor practice
charges are filed and the Board finds reasonable cause to be-
lieve that such unfair labor practice is continuing and will be
continued unless restrained, and will cause irreparable pro-
perty or personal injury or injury to the exercise of rights
guaranteed by section 7. Illustrative are the situations of fla-
grant and aggravated acts of picket line force and violence,
the situations of repeated discharge of union adherents, the
situations where employers or unions flagrantly refuse to
bargain in good faith, and the situations wherein the employer
threatens to intimidate his employees by closing the plant or
shifting work to affiliated factories.'
In a speech shortly after the subcommittee made its report, then
Chairman McCulloch stated, "I am mindful of the Pucinski Committee
recommendations, and they appear valid.' He pledged that the Board
would make greater use of the 10(j) injunction. Then he became
specific:
Turning to the employer unfair labor practices, the
greatest number of charges received by the Board continues
to be the illegal discharges because of union activities. There
could appropriately be a greater emphasis on the use of the
injunction to prevent recurring, anti-union campaigns de-
signed to stifle organizational drives. Thus, the Board could
well seek injunctions to restore discharged employees to their
jobs, if they are the leading union adherents and discharged
at the outset of an organizational drive. Experience has
taught us that our remedy of ultimate reinstatement with
back pay is regarded in some quarters as no more than a fee
for a union-hunting license. . . .
The second largest area of employer unfair labor practice
cases concerns refusal to bargain. Experience has shown that
an employer's successful postponement of bargaining for the
year or two it takes to process a Labor Board case and the
additional year or two it takes to secure judicial enforcement
of the Labor Board order, frequently dissipates the union's
majority status and weakens its bargaining power to the
extent that it can no longer effectively represent the em-
ployees. This justifies a more extensive use of Section 10(j)
02 Subcomm. on National Labor Relations Board of the Comm. on Education and
Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act by
the NLRB 52 (Comm. Print 1961).
Oa McCulloch, New Problems in the Administration of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act: The Taft-Hartley Injunction, 16 Sw. L.J. 82, 95 (1962).
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in respect to limited refusals to bargain, such as unilateral
changes, refusals to discuss certain matters, refusals to
furnish required information, insistence on illegal demands,
and the like."
Statistics indicate that use of the 10(j) injunction did increase during
the 1960's. However, the extent of its use was substantially limited.
Prior to 1960, the 10(j) injunction had been used just forty-seven
times." In fiscal years 1960-69, it was used on 138 occasions, or, on
the average, approximately fourteen times per year." As then Chair-
man McCulloch noted, "in recent years the Board has increased the
number of its applications for interim injunctive relief under Section
10(j), although that number is still quite modest." 67
It would seem that former Chairman McCulloch's hopeful re-
sponse to the Pucinski Committee's recommendations has not been
implemented by the Board. The limited increase in the use of 10(j)
hardly fulfills the expectations raised by the former Chairman's com-
ments; nor does it make utilization of preliminary relief a common
enough threat to deter the commission of unfair labor practices. The
Board itself may have realized the inadequacy of its limited use of
section 10(j) when it stated in a recent case that:
We have given most serious consideration to. the Trial
Examiner's recommended financial reparations Order, and
are in complete agreement with his finding that current
remedies of the Board designed to cure violations of Section
8(a) (5) are inadequate . .
Much as we appreciate the need for more adequate
remedies in 8(a) (5) cases, we believe that, as the law now
stands, the proposed remedy is a matter for Congress, not the
Board. In our opinion, however, substantial relief may be
obtained immediately through procedural reform, giving the
highest possible priority to 8(a) (5) cases combined with full
resort to the injunctive relief provisions of Section 10(j) and
(e) of the Act."
Only time will tell whether the Board implements the recommendation
contained in the above dictum more substantially than it did Chairman
McCulloch's remarks. If the Board does make greater use of 10(j)
64 Id. at 99.
66 1961 Hearings, supra note 39, at 1235-36.
60 See 25 NLRB Ann. Rep. 199 (1960), 26 NLRB Ann. Rep. 238 (1961) and notes
26-33 supra.
67 McCulloch, Past, Present and Future Remedies Under Section 8(a) (5) of the
NLRA, 19 Lab. L.J. 131, 137 (1968).
68 	Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740, 1741, 1743 (1970).
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relief in the future, the problems of who should have the power to
authorize such relief, and under what criteria, take on even greater
significance.
II. THE COURTS AND SECTION 10(j)
Promoting an expanded use of the 10(j) remedy through revision
and clarification of the applicable criteria is only the first step in
achieving a more effective enforcement of the National Labor Relations
Act. Once the Board files a petition for interim relief, the focus of
attention shifts to the judiciary. The courts have no uniform standard
by which to rule on requests for preliminary relief pursuant to section
10(j). At least three different standards have been applied:
1. a showing of reasonable cause for belief that the Act has
been violated; or
2. a showing of reasonable cause for belief that the Act has
been violated plus a showing that the injunction is neces-
sary to preserve the status quo and/or prevent irreparable
harm; or
3. a showing of reasonable cause for belief that the Act has
been violated plus a showing that the purposes of the Act
will probably be frustrated if interim relief is not granted.
It can be seen that common to all three is a finding of reasonable cause
to believe that the Act has been violated.° The first standard requires
only a showing of reasonable cause. Illustrative is Johnston v. Evans,"
where the court stated that " [t] his court, to determine whether injunc-
tive relief is warranted, needs only find that the Regional Director
has reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice has been
committed.''' The propriety of granting the relief follows automatically
from the finding of reasonable cause."
The second and third standards both require, in addition to the
09 Reasonable cause has been defined as "a 'reasonable possibility' that the unfair
labor charges will be sustained." Greene v. Mr. Wicke, Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 1012, 1016
(D. Conn. 1967). "[Tjhe test is whether a reasonable person would believe the facts to
constitute a violation of the law. The facts are not required to be sufficient to constitute
such violation, or to establish that the charges are true. A prima facie case, or a prob-
ability of violation, is all that is required." Brown v. National Union of Marine Cooks
and Stewards, 104 F. Supp. 685, 688 (ND. Cal. 1951).
70 223 F. Supp. 766 (E.D.N.C. 1963).
71 Id. at 769.
72 Several courts have applied this standard: Johnston v. Evans, 223 F. Supp. 766
(E.D.N.C. 1963); Fusco v. Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 465 (ND. Ohio 1962);
Kennedy v. Telecomputing Corp., 43 Lab. Cas. II 17,297 (S.D. Cal. 1961) ; Boire v
Tiffany Tile Corp. 13 NLRA Ct. Decisions 1442 (D.C. Fla. 1963); Getreu v. Gas
Appliance Supply Corp., 58 L.R.R.M. 2189 (S.D. Ohio 1963); Alpert v. Trailways of
New England, Inc., 51 Lab. Cas. 11 19,529 (D.C. Mass. 1965).
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requirement of reasonable cause, an independent finding as to the
necessity of interim relief. The latter two standards, however, differ
significantly. The second was applied in McLeod v. General Electric
Co.," where the court indicated that it is just and proper to issue 10(j)
relief only "to preserve the status quo or to prevent any irreparable
harm."" The court did not define "status quo" or elaborate upon its
requirement of "irreparable harm." 75 The third standard is set out in
Angle v. Sacks." There the court held that " [ t] he circumstances of the
case must demonstrate that there exists a probability that the purposes
of the Act will be frustrated unless temporary relief is granted.""
73
 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966).
74
 Id. at 850.
75
 The factual background of the case is as follows: General Electric (GE) had for
some time conducted separate collective bargaining negotiations with the approximately
80 unions that represented its employees. Most of the bargaining was held with at least
3 unions. In 1965 the AFL-CIO formed a special Committee on Collective Bargaining
consisting of the several unions that bargain with GE. The Committee's objective was
to adopt national goals and to utilize a coordinated approach in the 1966 negotiations.
A steering committee of this group was formed and it attempted to meet with GE repre-
sentatives on several occasions. The company consistently refused to meet with or recog-
nize the steering committee. In April, 1966, the IUE, the largest of the GE unions, and
one of the members of the Committee on Collective Bargaining, dropped its demand
that the company negotiate with the steering committee. A meeting was set up between
GE and the IUE's Negotiating Committee. At the May 4 meeting company officials dis-
covered that 7 members of the IUE Negotiating Committee were affiliated with other
unions that belonged to the Steering Committee. After making that discovery, company
officials left the room and refused to meet with the IUE Negotiating Committee as long
as it contained members of the other unions.
Both the IUE and GE filed unfair labor practice charges and the Board issued a
complaint against GE, alleging that it had violated section 8(a) (5) by its refusal to
negotiate with the IUE Committee as constituted. The Board then petitioned for pre-
liminary relief pursuant to § 10(j). A temporary injunction was issued by the district
court. McLeod v. General Electric Co., 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The district
court required an independent showing that relief was "just and proper" but no on the
same basis for such a finding that the Second Circuit required. After rejecting a flagrancy
test, the court held that "the remedy of Section 10(j) is surely appropriate and available
when the impact upon the public interest is grave enough to justify swifter corrective
action than the normal process of Board adjudication and court enforcement." 257 F.
Supp. at 708. The Second Circuit, of course, reversed. 366 F.2d 847 (2c1 Cir. 1966).
The Board obtained a stay of the Second Circuit judgment pending certiorari pro-
ceedings. McLeod v. General Electric Co., 87 S. Ct. 5 (1966). In his memorandum grant-
ing the stay, Mr. Justice Harlan observed: "The underlying issue in this case—the stan-
dards governing the application of Section 10(j)—has not heretofore been passed upon
by this Court and is of continuing importance in the proper administration of the Labor
Act." Id. at 6.
In a per curiam opinion, the Court granted the petition for certiorari. 385 U.S. 533
(1967). The Court did not decide the issue of standards for 10(j) because GE and the
IUE had signed a collective bargaining contract between the date the stay had been
issued and the date that certiorari was granted. The Court set aside the judgment of the
Second Circuit and ordered it to enter a new judgment, setting aside the order of the
district court and remanding to that court for such further proceedings as may be ap-
propriate in light of the supervening event.
70 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967).
77 Id. at 660. Elaborating' on the standard,' the court continued:
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Although the McLeod and Angle standards are similar in literal
terms, they may not be similar in application. In McLeod, the court's
reference to "preservation of the status quo" as a standard on which
10(j) relief should be granted is confusing. 78 The court's reference to
Administration of the Act is vested by Congress in the Board, and when the cir-
cumstances of a case create a reasonable apprehension that the efficacy of the
Board's final order may be nullified, or the administrative procedures will be
rendered meaningless, temporary relief may be granted under Section 10(j). Pres-
ervation and restoration of the status quo are then appropriate considerations
in granting temporary relief pending determination of the issues by the Board.
Id. In affirming the district court's injunction, the Tenth Circuit stated: "We conclude
that the circumstances of the case at bar were sufficient to raise a reasonable apprehen-
sion that the purposes of the Act could be defeated if temporary relief were not granted
under Section 10(j)." Id.
In Angle, the union commenced an organizational drive at the employer's plant in
June, 1966. An NLRB election was scheduled for September 28, 1966. In September, the
employer began a series of private interviews with individual employees in an effort "to
'find the root of the discontent and dissension in the plant" and not to influence the
election. On September 20, the employer discharged 6 of the 20 employees in the unit
and gave the others pay increases. The union filed unfair labor practice charges and the
regional director postponed the election pending disposition of those charges. A com-
plaint was filed against the employer alleging violations of §§ 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) and
a petition for § 10(j) relief was filed in the United States District Court for Kansas. The
court granted an injunction and ordered the reinstatement of all 6 dischargces. The court
of appeals made some modifications in the decree but generally affirmed the lower court.
A similar standard was adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967): "In determining the propriety of injunctive
relief the district court should be able to conclude with reasonable probability from the
circumstances of each case that the remedial purpose of the Act would be frustrated unless
immediate action is taken." Id. at 270.
The Minnesota Mining court quoted language from Angle with approval, including
that cited in note 77 supra. The facts of the Minnesota Mining case were almost identical
to those of McLeod v. General Electric Co. See note 75 supra. The district court granted
an injunction, but the Eighth Circuit reversed. The appellate court agreed that there
was reasonable cause to believe that the Act had been violated but held that the Board
had not shown that injunctive relief was just and proper under the circumstances of this
case. Angle was also quoted with approval in NLRB v. Aerovox Corp. 389 F.2d 475 (4th
Cir. 1967). Aerovox was a § 10(e) case in which the court stated that if § 10(j) standards
are met, then relief under § 10(e) is also proper. The court then quoted Angle as the
source of the preferred standard for § 10(j) relief. The standard developed in Angle and
Minnesota Mining was perhaps best summarized by the district court in Sachs v. Davis
& Hemphill, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 142 (D. Md. 1969):
Whether it would be just and proper to issue the proposed injunction in this
case turns on whether there exists a probability that the purposes of the Act will
be frustrated unless temporary relief is granted.
Id. at 148. In affirming, the Fourth Circuit stated:
As to the first prerequisite for relief pending appeal, the Board must establish
reasonable cause to believe the Act has been violated. This alone, however, is
insufficient to show why the normal processes of court enforcement should not be
followed. A second test should be applied. It must appear from the circumstances
of the case that the remedial purposes of the Act will be frustrated unless relief
pendente lite is granted. These standards, we believe, will generally satisfy the
Act's requirement that temporary relief be just and proper.
71 L.R.R.M. 2126, 2128 (1967).
78 See discussion p. 477 infra.
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"irreparable harm" may lead other courts to hold that any violation
that theoretically can be remedied under the Act should not be enjoined
pursuant to section 10 (j). The Angle standard, on the other hand, is
not as restrictive. Under Angle, the crucial consideration is not whether
there is a remedy, but whether the remedy available will be effective
when imposed.
Reference to other statutory provisions similar to section 10(j)
yields no clear cut standards employed by the courts to decide upon
the propriety of injunctive relief. The wording of most such statutes
is that injunctions will be granted upon a "proper showing."" What is,
or is not, a "proper showing," however, differs from court to court. At
least one decision, however, provides a basis for an argument that the
"irreparable harm" concept of the McLeod standard is not a proper
criterion for granting injunctive relief. In Hecht Company v. Bowles8°
the Supreme Court had to determine whether Section 205(a) of the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 .8' gave the courts discretion to
grant injunctive relief. This section provided that:
Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator any person
has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices
which constitute or will constitute a violation of any provision
of section 4 of this Act, he may make application to the
appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or prac-
tices, or for an order enforcing compliance with such pro-
vision, and upon a showing by the Administrator that such
person has engaged or is about to engage in any such acts or
practices a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining
order, or other order shall be granted without bond."
The issue was decided in favor of discretion. The Court relied upon
the wording of the statute" and the traditional flexibility of equity
practice to reach its result. In discussing the discretion that inheres to
the district courts, the Supreme Court stated that "their discretion
under Section 205 (a) must be exercised in light of the large objectives
of the Act. For the standards of the public interest, not the require-
ments of private litigation, measure the propriety and need for injunc-
79 See, e.g., § 13 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53 (a) (1970);
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77t(b) (1970); and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (e) (1970).
so 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
81 Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
82 Id. (emphasis added).
83 "It seems apparent on the face of Section 205(a) that there is some room for the
exercise of discretion on the part of the Court. For the requirement is that a 'permanent
or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order' be granted." 321 U.S. at 328.
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tive relief in these cases."" To the extent that Hecht invalidated the
equity criteria of private litigation in cases concerning statutory in-
junctive relief, the second standard's requirement of "irreparable in-
jury," as expressed in McLeod, is inappropriate."
McLeod also spoke in terms of preservation of the status quo:
"[t]he Board has not demonstrated that an injunction is necessary to
preserve the status quo or to prevent any irreparable harm." 86 It is
unclear whether the court intended to suggest "preservation of the
status quo" as a standard upon which a court should grant interim
relief." If the court did so intend, it did not elaborate. Preservation of
the pre-violation status quo, although an appropriate goal of interim
relief, is not a clear standard upon which such relief should be
granted."
There remain the first and third standards B0 Under the first, the
Board would have to establish reasonable cause in both fact and law.
If the Board could establish the facts in a given case, but could not
establish that the facts constitute an unfair labor practice at law, then
the reasonable cause requirement would not have been met. Convincing
a court that a given set of facts constitutes an unfair labor practice
may be especially difficult where there are no decisions in point.°°
Although it is not an "easy" standard for the Board to meet, it is
nevertheless the easiest of those here considered. If the courts were to
adopt this standard, the percentage of cases in which injunctions were
granted would probably increase. This increase, together with an
increase in the number of injunctions sought, would lead to more
effective enforcement of the Act. It might also lead to the deterrence
of certain types of unfair labor practices.
Those who oppose the adoption of this standard fear that an
increased use of the preliminary injunction would "muddle the proper
allocation of administrative and judicial functions"" by depriving the
84 Id. at 331.
85 See, e.g., Douds v. Anhauser-Busch Inc., 99 F. Supp. 474 (D. N.J. 1951); Davis
v. Huttig Sash & Door Co. 288 F. Supp. 82 (W.D. Okla. 1968).
86 366 F.2d at 850.
87 The Court may have intended to state that the standard is whether the Board
can show the necessity of preserving the status quo pending final adjudication. "Irre-
parable harm" may have been mentioned as one, perhaps the only, way in which the
Board could establish the necessity of preserving the status quo.
88 See, e.g., Fusco v. Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 465 (ND. Ohio 1962); Sachs
v. Davis & Hemphill, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 142 (D. Md. 1969).
85 See p. 473 supra.
go The Second Circuit in the McLeod case was especially concerned that no court
had passed on the legality of GE's actions. But the court did note that the basic legal
question underlying the company's conduct had indeed been decided by the Board. 366
F.2d at 850.
DI See, e .g
., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir.
1967).
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courts of the NLRB's expertise in this area of the law. Two points
should be made in response to this argument. First, it appears that
a certain amount of muddling was envisioned by Congress when it
enacted section 10(j). Provisions similar to section 10 (j)—authorizing
injunctive relief while administrative agencies adjudicate the merits
of a complaint—are not uncommon.D2
 Furthermore, as stated in Hecht,
it is the large objectives of the Act that govern in resolving the question
whether interim relief should be granted.° 3 Second, the importance of
Board expertise is diminished when there is Board precedent in point.
The Board's belief that existing precedent is in point is demonstrated
by the Board's own decision to seek interim relief." In the absence of
applicable Board precedent, the burden of showing "reasonable cause"
becomes much greater.
Another argument proffered against the "reasonable cause" stan-
dard is that it is not supported by the legislative history." This argu-
ment is not persuasive for several reasons. First, the legislative history
does not speak in terms of standards that courts should adopt in
disposing of 10(j) petitions; second, both the statute and the legislative
history envision some discretion to be exercised by the court in fashion-
ing standards; and finally, there is certainly nothing in the history
which intimates that adoption of a "reasonable cause" standard is
beyond the court's discretion. It should be noted that adoption of this
or any other standard does not limit the traditional flexibility of an
equity court. If the defendant can show exceptional circumstances that
militate against the court's use of its own standard, the court would
certainly be free to deviate from that standard.
Several courts have rejected the first standard and adopted the
third"—i.e., the "reasonable cause for belief" requirement plus a show-
ing that the purposes of the Act will probably be frustrated if interim
92 See statutes cited in notes 79 and 81 supra.
03
 Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 331.
04 It might be argued that if the General Counsel has final authority to decide
whether 10(j) relief will be sought, the possibility of circumventing the Board increases.
The argument is unrealistic for the following reasons. First, it assumes that the General
Counsel would pay little attention to Board precedents and decisions as they relate to
the facts in a given case. Second, it fails to note that the General Counsel's power is
delegated to him from the Board and that delegation is not necessarily permanent.
05 See discussion of the legislative history of section I0(j) at pp. 470-73 supra.
96 See, e.g., Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967)
where the court stated: "In our view, as suggested by the quoted excerpt from the Senate
Report, the district judge's discretion in granting temporary relief under Section 10(j)
cannot be activated and motivated solely by a finding of 'reasonable cause' to believe
that a violation of the Act has occurred. More is required to guide his permissive range
of discretion . . . . In determining the propriety of injunctive relief the district court
should be able to conclude with reasonable probability from the circumstances of each
case that the remedial purpose of the Act would be frustrated unless immediate action
is taken. Id. at 270.
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relief is not granted. Among the arguments made for adoption of this
standard are the following: first, that it is most consistent with the
legislative history of section 10(j) ;" second, that it is most consistent
with the general scheme of the Labor Act;" third, that it places a
reasonable limit upon the situations in which interim relief will be
granted; and finally, that it provides for the most efficient allocation
of enforcement responsibilities between the Board and the district
courts.
The first argument is not persuasive for the reasons noted above.
The legislative history does not indicate any standards which the
courts should adopt in ruling on requests for 10(j) relief. Indeed, both
the statute and the legislative history envision discretion by the court
in developing a standard. Furthermore, nothing in the legislative
history limits such discretion to this particular standard. The second
argument should be noted but not carried too far. By adopting Section
10(j), Congress added it to the general scheme of the Act; it must be
considered as much a part of the Act as any other provision.
The third and fourth arguments are somewhat more persuasive.
It must be recalled that one of the consequences of the Board's adop-
tion and faithful implementation of the proposed criteria would be an
increased workload upon the district courts." It was noted that only
court and not Board action could resolve the workload problems.'"
The "reasonable cause plus frustration" standard does place a limita-
tion upon the number of situations in which interim relief will be
granted. Any such limitation would soon be reflected in the number of
requests which the Board makes for 10(j) relief. The reasonableness
of the limitation is evident. In those cases where the regular Board
procedures would achieve the purposes of the Act, interim relief is not
necessary to protect the parties. Whatever positive benefit interim
relief might provide would be overshadowed by the great amount of
time needed to dispose of each 10(j) request. On the other hand,
where interim relief is necessary to prevent frustration of the purposes
of the Act, the advantages to the court in providing it would far out-
weigh the time disadvantages.
The fourth argument, which is related to the third, concerns
judicial efficiency. In those cases where Board action itself would
safeguard the purposes of the Act, it would be most inefficient for a
07 See note 95 supra.
08 The general scheme is one where an administrative agency adjudicates whether or
not an unfair labor practice has been committed; appeal then may be had to the courts.
General enforcement responsibilities rest with the administrative agency.
09 See discussion at p. 470 supra.
100 Id.
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court to spend its time deliberating upon a 10(j) request.' It is
equally inefficient from the context of the entire enforcement system
of the Act to have both the Board and the judiciary become involved
in a task that one can handle adequately alone. On the other hand, if
court action is needed to prevent frustration of the Act's objectives,
relief should be granted under this standard.
The "reasonable cause plus frustration" standard has certain
advantages over the "reasonable cause" test. It would provide for the
most efficient allocation of the Act's enforcement responsibilities. It
would provide interim relief in those cases where such relief is needed
to prevent frustration of the Act's objectives. It would deny interim
relief where regular Board procedures are sufficient to prevent frustra-
tion of the Act's objectives. Finally, this standard would go far toward
easing the workload problem created by the Board's adoption and
faithful implementation of the new criteria.
Adoption of the "reasonable cause plus frustration" standard,
however, leaves unanswered a crucial question: what is required in
order to show that the Act's purposes will probably be frustrated if
interim relief is not granted? This question can only be answered in a
case by case manner. Some general observations about the suggested
standard seem' appropriate. First, it should be emphasized that only a
probability of frustration must be shown. The Board need not show
that the Act's purposes will be frustrated in the absence of interim
relief.102
 Second, it should also be emphasized that the standard does
not limit the court to negative rather than affirmative relief. Orders to
reinstate dischargees or to bargain are not necessarily improper. The
propriety of such affirmative relief has been the subject of some dispute.
The question of affirmative relief in cases involving section
8(a) (3) discriminatory discharges has been most controversial. In
Johnston v. Wellington Manufacturing Division,'" the district court
found the evidence sufficient to enjoin future discrimination, but re-
101 After the district court grants interim relief pursuant to 10(j), normal Board
processes must still take place.
102 Imposition of a burden to show that the Act's purposes will be frustrated would
be an almost impossible obstacle on the road to interim relief. Employer unfair labor
practices preceding a representation election offer a good example. Assume that the em-
ployer commits violations of 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) immediately before the election and in
the midst of the campaign, and that the Board has established in a district court 10(j)
proceeding that it has reasonable cause to believe that the Act has been violated. Under
the suggested standard, the Board must show a probability that a free and uncoerced
choice of a bargaining representative will not take place without interim relief. Under the
"will-be-frustrated" variable, the Board would have to prove an absolute: that the free
and uncoerced choice of a bargaining representative was impossible without interim relief.
A strong employer showing might rebut the impossibility argument but not necessarily
the probability contention.
103 49 L.R.R.M. 2536 (W.D.S.C. 1961).
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fused to reinstate the already discharged employees because it was not
"clear" that the employees were entitled to reinstatement.'" This
special burden to justify reinstatement has been criticized by commen-
tators'°8 and rejected by a majority of the courts which have considered
the issue.'" The better rule was stated by the federal district court in
Elliot v. Dubois: 1°7
In the pending case delay might well defeat the purpose
of the Act. Discharged employees may move away or obtain
other jobs resulting in dissipation of union strength.
In order to carry out the intention of Congress, the
status quo must be maintained. Ordering respondent to re-
instate the employees and enjoining it from discriminating
against them for the purpose of discouraging membership in
a union and from interfering with their right to organize
simply preserves the status quo and to that extent the applica-
tion for injunction must be sustained.'"
Assuming that no special burden is imposed upon the Board when
petitioning for reinstatement of dischargees,'" proof of reasonable
cause to believe that a violation has occurred may be difficult. As one
commentator has noted:
[T]he discharge has been used with increasing sophistication
in recent years. Neutral employees may be dismissed along
with union activists in order to disguise the employer's
motive. Particular operations and even product lines may be
discontinued, at least temporarily, to ease key union sup-
porters out of plants. More generally, increasing care has been
exercised to develop a variety of plausible reasons for dis-
missing union members. 11°
If the Board can establish reasonable cause to believe a section 8(a) (3)
violation has taken place,' the suggested standard imposes no special
104 Id. at 2538.
tea See, e.g., Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 38, 130 (1964).
100 For cases where reinstatement of dischargees was ordered without imposition of
any special burden, see Angle v. Sacks, 65 L.R.R.M. 2098 (D. Kan. 1967), aff'd as modi-
fied, 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967); Elliot v. Dubois Chemicals, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 1
(N.D. Tex. 1962); Reynolds v. Curley Printing Co., 247 F. Supp. 317 (M.D. Tenn.
1965); Davis v. Le Tourneau, Inc., 78 L.R.R.M. 2616 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
107 201 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Tex. 1962).
tos Id. at 3.
2" No special burden would be imposed under the suggested standard.
110 Bok, supra note 105, at 132.
111 For a case where the Board was unable to meet the "reasonable cause" test, see
Johnston v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 234 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.C. 1964).-
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burden to gain reinstatement of the dischargees. The Board need only
show that the purposes of the Act will probably be frustrated if rein-
statement is not granted.112
Affirmative orders to bargain have also been somewhat contro-
versial. However, there is nothing in the proposed standard which
would prevent them; if the Board can meet its burden, an affirmative
order to bargain could be made. In fact, several courts have entered
such orders.'" Aside from these generalizations, the proposed stan-
dard's requirement of a showing that the Act's objectives will probably
be frustrated unless interim relief is granted can only be defined on a
case by case basis.
CONCLUSION
An examination of NLRB internal procedures reveals that they
do not encourage the effective use of section 10(j). To minimize delay
and to diminish the opportunity for prejudgment, the General Counsel
should be given authority to institute 10(j) proceedings. In order to
give all parties an opportunity to argue intelligently concerning the
propriety of temporary relief, a set of meaningful criteria for the use
of 10(j) should be adopted. If the hereinabove proposed criteria are
adopted and faithfully implemented, increased utilization of section
10(j) will follow.
Similarly, this article has examined the three major standards
used by the courts in disposing of 10(j) requests. Of those examined,
the "reasonable cause for belief" requirement plus a showing that the
purposes of the Act will probably be frustrated appears to be the
standard which will promote greater use of the 10(j) remedy without
unduly burdening the judicial system. An expanded use of the 10(j)
remedy in turn will lead to a more effective enforcement of the National
Labor Relations Act. Alleged violators would not be allowed to benefit
from the long delays inherent in normal Board procedures and hope-
112
 For cases where such a showing has been made, see note 106 supra.
H3
 Davis v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 288 F. Supp. 82 (W.D. Okla. 1968) ; Hender-
son v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 53 Lab. Cas. 11 11,081 (D.N.M. 1966) ; Johnston v. George-
town Steel Corp., 76 L.R.R.M. 2515 (D.S.C. 1970) ; Lebus v. Manning, Maxwell and
Moore, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. La. 1963); Rains v. East Tenn. Packing Co., 240
F. Supp. 770 (ED. Tenn. 1965).
One context in which the order to bargain has proven particularly controversial is
where the employer refuses to bargain for the sole purpose of testing the legality of a
Board certification. The courts have divided on this problem. For a decision holding such
an order proper when all other requirements have been met, see Lebus v. Manning, Max-
well and Moore, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. La. 1963). For a decision holding that such
an order is improper under the statute, see Greene v. David Buttrick Co., unreported case
no. 65-153-W. (D. Mass. 1965). Under the suggested standard, such an order would
not be per se improper. If all other requirements were met such an order to bargain
should be made. 1 •
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fully would be deterred in some' cases from committing unfair labor
practices.
Section 10(j) cannot and should not be the "normal" remedy for
employer unfair labor practices.'" However, it can and should be an
effective tool for an improved enforcement of the NLRA. The sug-
gestions made in this article are designed to make this little used
section of the Act a more meaningful provision and one that will
contribute significantly to the realization of the Act's objectives.
114 This article has been limited to a discussion of employer unfair labor practices.
It should be noted that union unfair labor practices may also be subject to requests
for 10(j) relief and injunctions. All the suggestions made in the article regarding in-
ternal NLRB procedures and court standards for disposition of 10(j) petitions are also
applicable to union unfair labor practices.
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